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IMPARTIAL REVIEW

OF THE

Present Troubles of *Germany*,

THE

Conduct of the GENERALS now in the FIELD,

And particularly of the late

BATTLE of *DETTINGEN*;

As also of the

PRESENT PLAN of POLITICKS

OF THE

Emperor and Queen of *Hungary*, and
their AUXILIARIES.

IN A

LETTER

FROM A

MEMBER of the DIET at *Ratisbon*,

TO A

PUBLICK MINISTER at the *Hague*,

Dated the 4th of JULY, N. S. 1743.

Translated from the Original *French*.

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AN
MARTIAL REVIEW

OF THE
Present Troops of Germany

IN
the Field

AND
BATTLE OF DEZINGEN

IN
THE YEAR 1745

BY
EMPEROR and QUEEN of Prussia, and
their ALEXANDER

IN A
LETTER

FROM
A MEMBER of the Diet at Ratisbon

TO A
PUBLIC MINISTER at the Hague

IN THE YEAR 1743

Translated from the Original Latin
LONDON
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Ratisbon, July 4. 1743.

S I R,

IF we at *Ratisbon* be nearer the Scene of War, you at the *Hague* are certainly much nearer that of Politicks, and consequently better able to inform us on the Banks of the *Danube*, of the Conduct of the active Courts of *Europe*, than we can possibly be to give you in *Holland*, any new Lights on so trite a Subject : But since you insist I should blend my Thoughts of the political Conduct of the *Imperial* and *Austrian* Auxiliaries, with what I may think of that of their Generals in the Field, I shall endeavour to obey you at the Hazard of exposing my Ignorance ; for I had much rather be thought a weak Statesman than a lukewarm Friend.

When I say I hazard the exposing my Ignorance in complying with your Desire, I would have it understood, that I mean in expressing myself distinctly and clearly ; for as for Matter and Observation, I pretend to no more than ecchoing to you the Sense of all the publick Ministers here. The Commotions at our Door, and the unsettled State of the Empire in general, leave us but too much Room for Speculation, the Offspring of *Leisure*, of which we, who compose the *Diet*, have had more than we desired ever since the Election of the Head of this mighty Body.

The *Germanick* is most certainly a powerful or mighty Body, taken collectively ; but past, and particularly present Experience may convince us, that it

may be debilitated so as to receive Laws from an inferior Power. This must proceed from Defects in the original Constitution of the Empire, among which that of vesting, or rather permitting many of its Members to enjoy absolute Sovereignty, is not the least. All the Advantages gained of the Empire by its Neighbours, were owing to this Cause ; so were all the Convulsions that have happened in its Bowels, not excepting the present destructive Broils.

The Ambition of the House of *Bavaria* and Intrigues of *France*, were alone insufficient to kindle up such a Flame as we have seen since the Death of *Charles VI.* if some of the principal, I may say independent Members of this great Body, had not found, or thought to have found their Interest in the Discord and Confusions of their Country. If *Pr——a* had been more dependent ; had she been less absolute, she would have been in no Condition to give such early Disturbance to the Body of which she was but a Part : And had *H——r* been kept in her original Subordination, her Ambition to extend her Limits and increase her Power, had not been so fatal to *Europe* in general, and *Germany* in particular, as it has been known to be since the last general Peace.

If the Emperor *Leopold* had consulted the Interest of the Empire ; nay, had he regarded that of his own House, he had never consented to an Increase of the Electoral Dignity. But why shall we wonder at the Errors of that weak Prince, when we reflect, that so consummate a Statesman as the late King *W——m*, was no less fallible, in having been the Means of *Leopold's* acting so impolitickly.

The Annals of King *W——m* paint him both wise and valiant, they produce him as excelling in the Cabinet and Field. I won't enter into a formal Dispute

pute with the Panegyrist of a Prince who was, without any doubt, the luckiest of his Time: For, with the Majority of Mankind, *Luck* includes not only Wisdom and Valour, but all other Virtues and Endowments. He might be a good Officer tho' unfortunate; and may be a good Statesman tho' not infallible. That he was not infallible, is certain, since it is now notorious, that he was overseen in two of the most essential Actions of his Life; I mean the *Partition Treaty*, and the Elevation of the House of *H——r*. By the first, he undesignedly paved the Way of the House of *Bourbon* to the Crown of *Spain*; and by the second, as undesignedly paved the Way for an Increase of the Power of *France*, a Decrease of that of the House of *Austria* and *Great Britain*, and for weak'ning the Props that support a Balance of Power in *Europe*, on which he seemed to fix his Views and Heart.

'Tis thought that a pungent Regret for having been over-reached in the *Partition Treaty*, had shorten'd that Great Man's Days; but had he lived to see what has happened in consequence of some other of his Measures, I don't think his Concern would have decreas'd.

'Tis scarce doubtful that King *W——m* intended an Increase of the *Germanick* Power, the better to curb the Ambition of *France*, when he projected the Settlement of the Crown he wore on a Prince of the House of *H——r*; nor is it less dubious, notwithstanding the Suggestions of many Writers, that he had the future Happiness of his Subjects in View. But let us be allowed to say, that however that Great Man may have been inclined; however he may have intended, it now appears but too evidently, that he might have taken other Steps, which would have

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conducted with less Uncertainty to the glorious Ends which his Panegyrist says he had in View.

His Partizans may, if they please, insist upon the Rectitude of his Measures; but without refining on his Politicks, or sifting his Intentions, was it not obvious that a powerful Crown would inspire a *German* Prince with Ambition, the which would naturally be attended with a strong Desire of enriching and extending the Limits of his hereditary Dominions, and of acquiring Power, and making a Figure in his native Country? Was it not likewise evident, that all Acquisitions to the Family-estate must be at the Expence of the Crown entailed; and that, as every Acquisition of Power in *Germany*, must be in some measure at the Expence of the House of *Austria*, all Enlargement of Territory, or Power on the Side of *H—r*, must not only weaken that House, but raise such a Spirit of Jealousy and Suspicion among the Members of the *Germanick* Body, as would answer the Views of *France*, and endanger the Balance of Power?

Louis XIV. the most penetrating Prince of his Time, foresaw the Consequences, not only of the *Partition*, but of the *Settlement* of the *B—b* Crown, and far from obstructing either, powerfully, tho' secretly, promoted the latter, and projected the former. Nay, some go so far, as to impute the first favourable Impressions concerning the House of *H—r*, to the Policy of the Cabinet of *Versailles*: But be that as it will, I don't think that any thing of Consequence has happened either in *Germany* or *Britain*, since the Accession, but what might have been foreseen when the Act of Settlement was under Consideration.

'Tis easy, you will say, to deduce Arguments from

from past Facts, and consequently to raise Objections to the Rectitude of past Conduct. But pray, my dear Friend, can there be any Necessity for having Recourse to the *past*, in order to judge of the Expediency of those Measures we are examining? The political Impropriety of the *Partition Treaty*, stares one full in the Face, (*sote aux yeux*); nor need one be a *Machiavel*, to see that *France* would be courted by the new Family as soon as the Succession should take place, such an Ally being necessary to awe the Head of the Empire, who would not, without Jealousy, see any considerable Enlargement of Power and Territory in the Empire by a Protestant Elector.

'Tis true, the *English*, who are painted by some, to be more wise than steady, concurred with their King; but was it out of Deference to his Judgment, or to acquire his Favour? They are much belied, or many of them foresaw what has happened since the Accession, but the Influence of the Court — The Concurrence of that People is no Proof to me of the Rectitude of the Measure; for I have observed them concurring ever since the *Accession*, in many Measures that were certainly disadvantageous to their Country. Tho' I mention the *English* Nation in general, yet I mean their Representatives in their Parliaments or Senates, who may be call'd the Nation without Impropriety, as they not only represent the whole People, but conclude them by their Acts. In what Light then will the Concurrence of that Nation appear, if we examine their Conduct since the Death of the last Monarch of the *Stuart* Race?

If the Situation of *Europe*, at the Death of Queen *Anne*, be duly considered, the Conduct of the Court of *London*, and Concurrence of the *B—h P—ts*,
will

will be thought extremely mysterious, if not contradictory, to all who distinguish not the separate Interests of *Great Britain* and *Hanover*. But with this Clue one may very safely reckon upon arriving at the Port of true Knowledge. One may easily trace this favourite *H——n* Interest down from the Year 1714 to the present Hour. It appears not more evidently in the Purchase of *Bremen* and *Verden*, and the War with *Sweden*, to gratify and induce *Denmark* to part with her Conquests, than in the subsequent War with *Russia*, to induce *Sweden* to ratify the Sale. It does not appear less evidently in the unnatural Alliances contracted with *France*, than in the Slights and Indignities put upon the late Head of the Empire; nor was it more conspicuous by the Neutrality of *England* and *Hanover*, during the late War, on Account of the Election of *Poland*, than it is even now, when the Armies of *England* and *Hanover* are in the Heart of the Empire.

I don't know how your Sages at the *Hague* had reasoned on the March of those Troops into *Germany*, but here, at *Ratisbon*, we looked upon it as an undigested Measure, owing partly to Necessity, partly to an Over-cautiousness, or rather Over-tenderness for the dear *E——e*, and partly to the Craft of the new *English* Ministry, and the false Ambition of a certain *P——e*, who would be thought a great Captain. The Clamour in *England*, on account of the Partiality of the Bargain for the Troops of *H——r*, and for that these *German* Mercenaries could not act against the Head of the Empire, made it necessary to march them somewhere out of the *Netherlands*, where the *Dutch* would very unwillingly see the War break out. To lay then the Clamour of the *English* Nation, to give some Colour
of

of an Intention of supporting the Queen of *Hungary*, and to give Ease to the Scruples of the *Dutch*, it was necessary to march the Troops out of the *Netherlands*; and whither must they have gone, but cross the *Rhine*, if it was intended they should serve for Parade only?

Here then appears very evidently the Necessity of marching the Troops out of the *Netherlands*; but it seems no less evident, that by marching them cross the *Rhine*, it was not intended to come to Blows with *France*. Nor does the late Action at *Dettingen* weaken this Supposition; or, if it should, it would prove the Generals of the Queen of *Hungary*'s Auxiliaries to be as unskilful as the Statesmen of a certain powerful Island were unfaithful to their own Country, in order to enlarge and enrich a foreign Territory.

Was it not the particular *Interest* of this Territory which with-held the Power and Resentment of *England*, as soon as the ambitious Intentions of *Prussia*, *Bavaria* and *France* were made manifest? Was it not that particular *Interest* which produced the Neutrality for *H—r*, and the Vote of that E—e in favour of his present Imperial Majesty? The House of *Austria* was too great for *H—r*, though not for *England*; and therefore, though it was the Interest of that Crown, that the Imperial Dignity should continue in the House of *Austria*, the Vote was given to a Prince of another House, as being more immediately for the Interest of *H—r*, that he should be elected.

The Partizans of the House of *H—r* don't attempt justifying the Vote to the Elector of *Bavaria*, on any other Footing than that of Necessity, occasioned by the March of Marshal *Maillebois*: But herein they are mistaken; for the Promise of the

Vote was made to the late Cardinal *Fleury* before *Maillebois* left *Paris*. But, supposing the March of *Maillebois*'s Army to have intimidated, why was not the Court of *London* as early in Preparations as that of *Versailles*? Why did not *H——r* take early Care of herself? The World is grossly mistaken, or there was no want of Treasure at *H——r*; and 'tis equally well known, that Money will soon raise Armies in *Germany*; I may say instantly.

But it would not answer the particular Purposes of the *E——e* to have acted otherwise. It was resolved to bring down the House of *Austria*; and, therefore, to have an Emperor of another House: But this could not be done with any colourable Grace, unless it should appear compulsory. This must have been the true Reason for that memorable Vote, or a worse; I mean a Reason which would much worse bear the Light.

Let what will be the Motive for that extraordinary Vote, 'tis certain it has been attended with evil Consequences, with regard to the House of *Austria* and the Balance of Power. A single Negative in the Electoral College, might give a Colour for a new Election, which probably would fall on the *Grand Duke*; and which the present Emperor might not very strenuously oppose, should he fail of an Increase of Territory, which was his principal View in soliciting the Diadem.

In giving the Vote, all Excuse for future Opposition was cut off. What Colour can a *German* Prince have for opposing a Head of the Empire whom he himself had chosen? And should he be put into the *Ban* of the Empire for his Opposition, would it be an Injustice? 'Tis happy for a certain Elector, as Matters have lately fallen out, that the Emperor

peror is impotent of Power. But should the War continue, there is no knowing where Power may be fixed. As Matters stand at present, the Scene of Action is like to be transferred from the *Danube*, the *Mayn* and *Neckar*, to the *Moselle*, *Maese* and *Scheld*: For *France* seems determined to take away all Excuse from the Court of *Vienna*, for continuing the War against the Emperor, by withdrawing her Troops from *Bavaria*; and from the Empire, if that will give Content to the too sanguine Allies of her *Hungarian* Majesty. And what may be the Consequences of a War, wherein *France* need, for some Time at least, be but on the defensive only; or where Power would be fixed after such a Conflict, is beyond all human Knowledge. But if Experience be a faithful Guide, there is a strong Probability that *France* would come no Loser, and that the Heiress of *Austria* would come no Gainer out of such a War.

However impolitic it may seem for the Queen of *Hungary* and her Ally in the Field, to meditate an offensive War against *France*; and however unlikely it be that these Powers should form any Hopes of Success in so unequal a Conflict, yet the late Action at *Dettingen*, shews but too evidently that *France* has Proof of such an offensive Alliance: For, considering that Marshal *Noailles* must have known the Intentions of his Court as to the Evacuation of *Bavaria*, and thereby removing the main Obstacle that seemed hitherto to obstruct Peace between the Emperor and the Queen of *Hungary*, 'tis not probable that he would risk his Men in attacking the combin'd Army, if there had not been Proof of an offensive Alliance against *France* singly. But before I proceed in my Observations on such Alliance, or the Motives of it, you won't be displeased that I give you a succinct, but genuine Account

count of that Action, which has been so variously reported by e^t those who ought, by their high Rank, to be above ^risrepresentation. Don't however expect a military prejudiced Detail of that sharp Combat; but, rather, such an Account as may be look'd for from one well informed, and no Enemy to either Side, but no Soldier.

Tho' it seems to be evident, that there was no Intention of acting offensively in the Empire, against its Head, with the mercenary Troops of *Hanover* and *Hesse*, when they were taken into the Pay of *England*, but rather, that they were to act against *France* in *Flanders*; yet is it likely that the succeeding bad Success of the Emperor in *Bobemia* and *Bavaria*, and the Clamour in *England* against these Mercenaries, had altered the first Plan of the court of *L——n*. The Emperor's growing Disability to be revenged of *H——r*, gave fresh Courage to the Auxiliary of *Hungary* to march at last into the Empire, tho' 'tis probable there was as yet no fix'd Resolution to act offensively; but had any Share of Success attended the Imperial Arms on the *Danube* and *Moldaw*, the Mercenaries in the *English* Pay had never been ventured to the *Mayn*, or even beyond the *Rbine*.

As a Proof that, when the combin'd Army passed the *Rbine*, it was not intended to march up as far as the *Mayn*, much less higher into *Germany*, we find no Magazines, no Provision of any kind, secured for the March or Subsistence of so large a Body of Forces. If this be no Proof of an Intention not to march so far as the *Mayn*, it is certainly one of either the too great Parsimony or Unskilfulness of the Leaders. This appears evidently from the Consequence; for never was an Army, unemployed in Sieges or any other Military Operation of Difficulty,

so destitute of all the Necessaries of Life, as was that of the combin'd Army for near fifteen Days before the Affair of *Dettingen*. I must observe then from hence, that the Conduct of the Leaders is not as much to be applauded as the Bravery of the Troops; nor did this seem to appear more before than on the very Day of Action.

The Mistakes of the Generals of the combin'd Army appear to have been very early. Their passing the *Mayn* was condemned, because, if they had not repassed it precipitately, they risked the being attacked by a superior Army; or, if they should not, they must inevitably find themselves in want of Provisions. But the Reason asserted for repassing that River seems to wear a worse Face, if possible, than the first Passing. 'Tis said, the Repassing was for Want of Artillery: A good substantial Reason without all Doubt! But who obliged them to pass without Artillery? or, what was become of it; or, why did it not pass along with the Troops? From this first extraordinary Motion of the combin'd Army, no great Matters were expected by us here from the Skill of its Chiefs, nor hitherto have we been mistaken.

To atone then for the first Error of passing the *Mayn*, when it was evident there was no Safety in continuing on this Side of it, 'tis thought a second was committed in taking Post so high as *Aschaffenberg*, without first securing the Navigation of the River ten or fifteen Miles higher, which might have been done with Ease; but, as if the Commanders had look'd upon the Navigation of that River as a Matter of no Consequence, they neglected it from its Source to the *Rhine*. 'Tis hard to guess why so gross a Neglect was committed; or, when it was, why the Army was detained so many Days in a
Camp,

Camp, when all Probability of being supplied was vanished, without passing the River, and hazarding a general Engagement with a superior Army.

'Tis a Mystery why the combin'd Army would proceed so high as the *Mayn* before it should be compleat. The Body of *Hessians* and *Hanoverians*, marching to join, was too considerable a Corps to be neglected. But all the Operations of the combin'd Army before the Battle of *Dettingen*, seem to be clouded and mysterious. There seems to have been no *Marlborough* or *Eugene* at their Councils of war. I shall examine presently what might be the Motives for the Commission of such a Series of Mistakes as appear here to have been committed from the passing the *Rhine* to the Action of the 27th, of which the following is pretty near the Relation, which is look'd upon here as the most candid.

Some affect to give out, that the March from *Aschaffenberg* was to prevent M. *Noailles* from cutting off the Corps of *Hanoverians* and *Hessians* on their March to the Army: But the Truth is, the Scarcity was such, that the combin'd Army must necessarily retire, or force their Way over the River, and dislodge the *French* from the great Plenty they enjoyed. M. *Noailles* knew their Wants, and had no other View than taking their Baggage to distress them the more, or to fall upon their Rear, as they should be obliged to retreat towards *Hanau*. He took his Measures, and laid his Bridges, the 26th of *June* in the Evening, and passed about 23,000 of his Army early the next Morning.

Tho' all this was transacted in the very Neighbourhood of *Aschaffenberg*, yet was it Six the 27th in the Morning before they were perceived, nor was it but by pure Hazard that the Motions of the *French* were

were known. Had it not been for the cautious Curiosity of a private Gentleman, (a Captain of a Company in the *British* Forces), the March of the *French* Detachment had not, in all Probability, been known 'till it appeared in Sight of the whole Army. M. *Noailles* had better Intelligence; for he knew it was resolved, that the combin'd Army should decamp the 26th early at Night; but, from a Confusion incident to a Multiplicity of Commanders, or to want of Experience or Order, it did not begin to move till about Three of the 27th in the Morning. Happy Confusion! for, had there been none to obstruct the Design of moving off at Eleven at Night, M. *Noailles* had infallibly come up Time enough to have fallen on the Baggage and Rear; but, by the Delay, the Front of the combin'd Forces was got no farther than where the Rear would have been, if they had moved off in the Night as was intended. Let us, however, call this Piece of good Luck by its true Name; let us not impute that to Conduct which is solely owing to Chance.

This fortuitous Intelligence of the Motions of the *French* Detachment, gave an Opportunity to the combin'd Army to form and draw up in Order of Battle; and without any Doubt, there was no Advantages that could be useful, but there was Time enough for taking: And if all such Advantages were not taken, let it not be imputed to want of Time, but rather to want of somewhat else, a want of which appeared but too visibly throughout the whole Action. The combin'd Army then being formed, I won't say as advantageously as it might, M. *Noailles*, one would think, had nothing more to do than to repass the *Mayn*; for, without any Dispute, 23,000 Men, however chosen and selected, were no Match for
44,000,

44,000, in a fair Field of Battle: But the natural Fire and Impetuosity of the *French* prevailed; and, perhaps, M. *Noailles* might have reckoned on the Rawness of the combin'd Troops, or more probably on that of the Generals. Be that as it will, the *French* charged first, and so furiously, that, had their Numbers equalled their Bravery and Conduct, it would probably have proved a fatal Action to the combined Forces.

'Tis allowed of all Hands, that the *French* behaved with great Gallantry, and with great Conduct, if their attacking at all, after they saw the whole combin'd Army drawn up in Order of Battle, be not an Error; I say, except the attacking at all be a Mistake, there seems to have been no other on the *French* Side; for they took all the Advantages the Ground would admit of, charged and retired with the greatest Regularity: In short, every Motion of theirs shew'd consummate Skill and Experience; but, on the other Hand, every Motion of the combined Army, during the whole Action, shewed Confusion and Inexperience. The Troops, in general, behaved so as to shew, that if the Command had equalld their Resolution, the *French* would have had sufficient Reason to repent them of having attacked an Army almost double their Number. 'Tis true, some of the *E——sb* Horse did not behave as might have been expected from chosen Men, and the best paid, mounted and accoutred in *Europe*; but the Misfortune is imputed rather to Error in some superior Officer, than the Subalterns or private Men. Error there was, and seems to have been general; for, from what we have here from the best Hands, the different Regiments or Corps, in the

B——sb

B Service especially, were left to act as they pleased without any superior Orders.

Before the Duke of *Aremberg* was wounded, and forced to quit the Field, the *Austrians*, in the Center, were drawn up with Skill; but after, they behaved so as to shew the want of Command amongst them, as well as throughout the rest of the Army. 'Tis true the Artillery, particularly the *Hanoverian*, seemed to be managed with Skill, owing, as we are informed, to the Experience of a *French* Engineer in that Service.

When I mention a general Misconduct on the Day of Action, I would not be understood to reflect on the Conduct of any particular Commander in the combin'd Army. There was an Error, and a very gross one; but, let the World charge it to Particulars, if it pleases; for my Part, 'tis a Task too invidious for me to take upon myself. Let me, however, say, that it can't be charged upon the *Great Prince*, who, on that important Day, divested himself of all Superiority and Rank, and contented himself with heading, as a private Colonel, a favourite *Hanoverian* Regiment on the left.

How gross soever the Mistakes were in the Conduct of some Commanders, the Goodness of the Troops in the main, and great Odds of Number, obliged the *French* to retire; but they retreated in so good Order, that the combin'd Army had no great Stomach to pursue them. This Passiveness was certainly owing to Error in the Commanders, or want of Appetite in the Troops; for, considering the Superiority of the combin'd Army, there was a fair Opportunity of destroying most of the *French* Detachment before they could repass the River, if there had been an early and vigorous Pursuit.

From this Instance, if there was no other, it is no bad presumptive Proof, that the Loss was pretty equal, or rather greater on the Side of the combin'd Army; but we have more authentick Proofs, which put the Point beyond Dispute, however the Partizans of each Side affect to lessen and exaggerate. The *French* lost more Officers, and particularly of Distinction, because they had more to lose; but as for Men in the general, 'tis computed by the Impartial, that the Loss on the Side of the Combin'd was about 3300 kill'd, and 2500 on that of the *French*. The Prisoners on both Sides were pretty equal, except that the *French* had more Officers taken; and, as for Ensigns, Banners, and other military Trifles, they were equally shared, but the *French* had the Advantage in possessing some of the Enemy's Cannon.

Upon the whole, to examine this Action strictly, there seems to be no great Room for boasting on either Side. In many Instances the remaining on the Field of Battle is thought to be a Sign of Victory; and, was this to be an invariable Maxim, the combin'd Forces must be allowed to have had the Victory; it being certain that they remain'd, for some Hours after the Retreat of the Enemy, on the Field. But, when we reflect how few Hours they stay'd; that, during their Stay, they were continually under Arms, tho' very heavy Rains fell; and that they march'd off before Day-light with so great Precipitation as to leave their Dead unburied, their Wounded, the best Part of their Baggage, and some of their Cannon behind them: I say, to consider the Conduct of both Armies immediately after the Action, one is at a loss where to fix the Advantage; but, if one considers the Consequences, he cannot hesitate to bestow it on the *French*, tho' they failed in a strict Execution

on of their first Design, supposing it to have been the taking of the whole Baggage of the combin'd Forces, and falling on their Rear on their March.

If we are to judge by the Consequences, the Advantage is certainly on the *French* Side: For, what was the View of marching so high as the *Mayn*? What was the View of securing the Post, and encamping at *Aschaffenberg*? It was, or ought to have been, to facilitate the Junction of the *Austrians* in the *Upper Palatinate* with the combin'd Army. But how is this End answered? Far from making any Advantage of a Victory claimed at *Dettingen*, the combin'd Forces made a forced March of near * 26 *English* Miles, the next Day, from the Field of Battle to *Hannau*, and turned their Backs upon the Posts on the *Mayn*, which it was intended to secure, in order to the Junction with Prince *Charles*, or Prince *Lobkowitz*, or both. If the Junction was not intended, I should be glad to know what was intended; for it does not appear that there was any other View in marching up to the *Mayn*. But, be the March of the combin'd Army, so high as the *Mayn*, taken in this or any other Light, 'tis plain, by their not securing Provisions, that they did not design to stay, or did not expect to be molested, much less attacked by the *French*.

To tell you then, my Noble Friend, freely the Opinion here of the March of the combin'd Army so high as the *Mayn*, 'tis thought there was no Dread of an Attack from the *French*, unless there was an Attempt of passing the *Neckar*, which was never intended. It was thought the *French* would not oppose passing the *Mayn*, as having no Posts upon it so tenable

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* Five German Miles.

nable as some on the *Neckar*. In short it was thought, that the combin'd Forces might parade on, and about the *Mayn*, till Affairs in the *Upper Palatinate* should take such a Turn, as should oblige the Emperor to come to Terms with the Court of *Vienna*. Had then the *French* not been so uncivil, as to break thro' the parading pacifick Scheme, might not a certain great Prince have assumed the Glory of putting an End to the Troubles of *Germany* without Risk or Bloodshed?

The glorious Scheme was certainly worthy of the great Personage 'tis ascribed to; but who it was that was intrusted with the Execution of it, is not so clearly known. Nor is it amiss, that the publick does not know where to fix the Error of not securing Provisions for an Army, supposing it designed for Parade only. The *French* indeed, in their *Gazettes*, seem to give us some Light into this dark Affair of the Scarcity of Provisions in the combin'd Army, by telling the World, that they had taken Prisoner the *Intendant* of the combin'd Army. As this happened many Days before the Action at *Dettingen*, we are to suppose, that the Scarcity was owing to the Misfortunes of that Gentleman; but who he was, or whether *English* or *Hanoverian*, is not come to my Knowledge; nor will you, I flatter myself, look upon it as any Disrespect for you, that I have neglected being informed of every Particular concerning an Affair of so little Importance. You will, I hope, think it sufficient to know, that no Care was taken of providing for the Army, without troubling yourself about the Author of a Neglect that had like to prove fatal to Thousands.

If this gross Neglect of marching a great Army without securing Provisions has not been attended with

with more fatal Consequences, let us impute it to Chance on one hand, and Mistake, or Fatality on the *French* Side, on the other: For, let us suppose, that the Confusion had permitted the combin'd Army to have moved off from *Aschaffenberg* at *Eleven* at Night, as it was intended, the Consequence would inevitably be, that the *French* Detachment would come up in time to fall upon their Rear, and take all the Baggage, without it being possible for the Van, or Gros of the combin'd Army, to prevent the Destruction of their Rear. But, as the Affair happened, assisted by Chance, what was it but fatal Error on the *French* Side, which prevented the entire Destruction of the combin'd Army; and what would be of infinitely worse Consequence, the taking one of the greatest Princes of the World Prisoner?

Perhaps you may wonder at this Strain of Reasoning; but I can assure you, that 'tis the Opinion of the most experienced Officers here, that the combin'd Army might have been so hem'd in by M. *Noailles*, that few could escape, had he taken his Measures right. 'Tis believed that General had 70,000 regular Troops in his Army. Had he then watched to have marched over half his Forces at *Aschaffenberg*, as soon as the Post was abandoned by the combin'd Army; for so wholly and precipitately was that important Post abandoned, that the Country came in to pillage the heavy Baggage that was left quite unguarded: I say, if M. *Noailles* had marched half his Army, instead of 23,000, over his Bridges below, and the other half over at *Aschaffenberg* above, might he not have hem'd in the combin'd Army, so as to starve them effectually, or oblige them to surrender; or oblige them to make two Fronts, and fight upon very unequal Terms?

Such

Such might have been the fatal Consequences of marching so high as *Aschaffenberg*, without securing the free Navigation of the *Mayn*, or otherwise providing for the Subsistence of the Army. But let us admire the Mercies of God, who invisibly works the Safety of his Creatures against all the Maxims of Reason, or even Probability. Let us not however always presumptuously reckon upon his Care of us, unless we correspond by acting upon the Principles of Reason, and according to the Lights held out to us by Experience.

'Tis as certain, that *Want* obliged the combin'd Army to rise up precipitately from *Aschaffenberg*, as that their Want would be increased, if the 12,000 *Hanoverians* and *Hessians*, on their March to the Army, had joined before they broke up. Therefore the wisest Step that could be taken was, to tread back the same Ground they came: But you have seen how fatal even that wisest Step might have proved, had the *French* made the most of their Advantage.

'Tis hard to know why M. *Noailles* did not make use of his whole Power when he determin'd to act offensively; but, be his Motive what it will, 'tis scarce dubious, that he might have ruined the combin'd Army, if he had made the most of the Disadvantages they lay under, and had brought upon themselves: But, why shall we wonder that one Man should err, when we see such gross Errors committed by Numbers on the other Side. M. *Noailles* was this one General, but there were four principal Commanders in the combin'd Army, of equal Years at least, if not of equal Experience with the *French* Marshal. If he did not succeed literally in his Design of passing the *Mayn*, it may be said he did

did virtually, since the combin'd Army quitted the Banks of the River, and retired from that important Spot where it was intended to wait for Prince *Charles*, or Prince *Lobkowitz*: But in no Sense can it be urged in favour of the Commanders of the combin'd Army, that they succeeded in any one Point they might have had in view, except it was to make a Figure in *Germany*, and acquire Military Knowledge.

The Operations on the *Main* had no manner of Effect on the Deliberations of his Imperial Majesty, with regard to the separating his Troops from the *French* in the *Upper Palatinate*; that Step was entirely owing to the Resolutions of the *Diet*, to procure him a safe and reasonable Peace, or arm the Empire in his favour. It was this wise and important Resolution which determined the Emperor to listen to *France*, who had projected this salutary Scheme for securing the House of *Bavaria* against the Ambition of the Court of *Vienna*, and for retiring her Army under M. *Broglio* towards her own Confines, the better to cover herself from any Attempts that might be made in consequence of a late offensive Alliance supposed to be contracted by the Queen of *Hungary* and her Auxiliaries.

I have already mentioned such an Alliance, on a Supposition, that M. *Noailles* would not have attacked the combin'd Army, unless he had Orders to endeavour the Destruction of Troops that would soon be employed against her singly: But without seeking the Reality of such an offensive Alliance for the Conduct of the *French* General, may it not be found in the Conduct of the Generals of the combin'd Army? or, rather, may it not be seen by the Conduct of the Courts of *L——* and *Vienna*, and by the indefatigable Solicitations

tions of the *B——b* and *Hungarian* Ministers at the *Hague*, and at all the Courts of the Empire? Either there is actually such an Alliance, or I will boldly determine, that the Conduct of the Auxiliaries of *Hungary* is without Meaning or Design, except that of making a Figure, and creating a vast Expence. We will take this Matter higher than the March of the combin'd Army to the *Mayn*, or even beyond the *Rhine* from the *Netherlands*.

Before the End of the last Year, 'tis notorious that *France* had found Means, both at *Vienna* and the *Hague*, to have it propos'd that the Emperor would willingly listen to Peace on the Footing of *uti possidetis*. Matters were carried on so far, as that the *States General* were press'd to offer their Mediation; and why that wise, cool People would refuse accepting the Offer of so seasonable and necessary a Mediation, is what I could never hear accounted for. The *States*, about that Time especially, were the only proper Mediators that could be thought of in *Europe*; for, 'till some Months after, they did not come into any sanguine Resolutions in favour of the Queen of *Hungary*.

Here then might the Broils of *Germany* cease, if the *States General* had accepted the Mediation, and shew'd a becoming Firmness; or if the Ambition, or Self-love, or Obstinacy, or Weakness, one don't know what to call it, of the Court of *Vienna*, had not stood in the Way. I know 'tis urged in Behalf of the Queen of *Hungary*, that she was influenced by the Court of *L——*. Some Excuse is better than owning a devouring Ambition; but this is a very lame one, and, I may say, a very improbable Excuse, at least would be thought so by all who should consider the Interest of *England* only.

It could never be for the Interest of *England* to have the War continue. In no Sense can a War on the Continent be of Advantage to that powerful Island; but a War in which it must necessarily take Part, should it continue, is of all others the most pernicious to that Kingdom: The War between the Emperor and Queen of *Hungary* would necessarily become general, in which Case *England* must become a Party; and as all Wars on the Continent must be destructive to that Insular Trading Nation, therefore it could never be the Court of *L*—— that had influenced that of *Vienna* to reject with Haughtiness the Offers of Peace continually made to her all the last Winter, and before, on the Footing of *uti possidetis*: For, what was the natural Interest of *England*? What ought her Views to be?

The true Interest of *England* was to support the Pragmatic Sanction, in order to balance the growing Power of the House of *Bourbon*; but in looking on whilst *Silesia*, the fairest Flower of the *Austrian* Inheritance, was torn from the Queen of *Hungary*, she sacrificed in part that true Interest. Supposing then *England* sensible of her Error, in not exerting herself as early as she might in favour of the Heiress of *Austria*, could she hope to retrieve her Mistake, by advising the Queen of *Hungary* to continue the War? Impossible; because the Continuance of the War could not, in all human Probability, better the Circumstances of the Heiress of *Austria*, and it might very likely render them much worse.

By continuing the War, the Court of *Vienna* must have had the Conquest and Detention of *Bavaria* in View, or that of *Lorraine* or *Alsace*, or *French Flanders*; let us examine these Views. The Princes of *Germany*,
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and particularly the King of *Prussia* would not, nay, could not, without risking his own Safety, see an Elector strip of his Dominions, and an Emperor reduced to the lowest Impotence and Beggary: Therefore, as an Attempt to annex *Bavaria* to the *Austrian* Dominions would necessarily bring the whole Empire on the Back of the Queen of *Hungary*, she could never intend to make herself whole for the Loss of *Silesia* at the Expence of the House of *Bavaria*: Therefore the Conquest of *Bavaria* could not be her View for continuing the War, after she might have obtained a Peace on the Footing of each Party to remain with what he possessed before the Death of the late Emperor. — Let us examine the probable Consequences of continuing the War in order to conquer *Alsace* or *Lorrain*.

To wave all Discussion of the Injustice of an Attempt to wrest Countries from any Power that possesses them in virtue of solemn Treaties, which is the Case of *France* with regard to these Provinces, let us consider the Inability of the Queen of *Hungary*, even supposing her supported by the whole Power of *England*, to maintain an offensive War against so potent a Crown as that of *France*. But you will say, perhaps, that she may be join'd by other Allies; and that by forming such an Alliance as we saw in the late Queen *Anne's* Days, *France* may be reduced to the lowest Ebb. I don't say but such another Alliance would have a Chance of humbling *France*; but I insist upon it, that such an Alliance at present is not practicable; and was it, that the Members of the old grand Alliance are not now in so happy a Situation as formerly, not excepting *England* and *Holland*; the Life and Spirit, as well as Support of all such Alliances.

But

But the Impracticability of such an Alliance as the last was, evidently appears from the Interest and Situation of the principal Powers of *Europe*. It would not be the Interest of any Prince in *Germany*, and less of the King of *Prussia* than any, that the Queen of *Hungary* should by any new Acquisitions become more powerful; therefore it is indisputably true, that no Power in *Germany*, even not excepting *H—r*, would become a Party to such an Alliance. They may hire out their Troops; but who, except *England* and *Holland*, would be in Circumstance to pay them? or, indeed, how could even the *Austrian* Troops be supported far from home, but by the Treasure of the Maritime Powers? For it is no Secret, that if the Queen of *Hungary* had not been exhausted as she is by the present War, she never was, nor could be monied enough to maintain great Armies far from home. The only Powers in *Europe* that can possibly do this, are *France*, *Spain*, and the *Maritime*: And in a War on her own Borders, *France* would have greatly the Advantage.

It being then out of all Dispute, that no Prince of *Germany* would involve himself to aggrandize the Queen of *Hungary*, we must seek for more remote Allies in the *North*: But too truly it may be said, that she could hope for none in that Part of the Globe. *Russia* and *Sweden* are too unsettled at home, and like to be so, for to hope that they would embark in a War from which they could not possibly hope for Advantage: And though *Denmark* be in less Apprehension of intestine Commotions, we may be assured, that its King has not the Will to break with *France*; and that, though he should, he has not the Power to affect her any otherwise than by

lending his Troops to those who may bid highest for them.—Here, again, we shall be obliged to have Recourse to the Maritime Powers for paying the Piper, it being certain, that her *Hungarian* Majesty, with all her pompous Titles, can scarce find Rosin for her own Fiddle.

We are at last come down to the only Power, except *England*, who is supposed to encourage the Continuance of the War, that could be an useful Ally to the warlike Queen in her Views of Conquest. This Power is *Holland*; but, for many Reasons, I can't bring myself to a Belief that that wise Republick would risk the being plunged into a general War, for any Consideration less than an Invasion of their Barrier, or some other Part of the *Austrian Netherlands*.

For how willing soever she may be to keep fair with, and even gratify *England*, I don't think that any Assault of that Crown could shake her pacifick Resolution. As Self-interest is the predominant Passion of most Nations, but particularly of the *Dutch*, I won't doubt they would join against *France*, if they could hope to acquire any Benefit by so doing: But where there is scarce a Chance of getting, and a Probability of losing, I shall never suppose that a *Dutchman* will risk his Butter and Cheese. I am not however so sure that they would not be glad to see their good Protestant Neighbours, the *English*, at Cuffs with the *French*, because then might they ingross the Trade of the World: And I would not swear but that they had some View of this kind, when they lately came into a Resolution of marching 20,000 of their Troops to join the combin'd Army on the *Mayn*. Should there be any Truth in this Conjecture,

cture, which, I own, is not altogether founded on the Maxims of Charity, we may easily account for the *States General's* refusing the Mediation, though pressed to it for many Months, and with the greatest Earnestness by *France*. The plodding *Dutch* find the Sweets of the present impolitick War between *England* and *Spain*; but could they keep themselves neuter in one with *France*, how would the lucrative Scene extend itself and brighten?

On this self-interested Foundation one may build many Suppositions that would not redound much to the Honour of the Republick; but I chuse rather to think, that she has shaped her Conduct so as to encourage the Queen of *Hungary* without breaking with *France*, on a Supposition that the Balance of Power will be the safer by the Continuance of the War, inasmuch as these Catholick Powers must necessarily exhaust and impare their Strength. But I hold this Notion to clash with the Maxims of sound Policy: For if *France* alone were to be impoverished, it might be prudent to prolong the War; but as Matters stand at present, *Austria*, or rather *England*, her Nurse, drops Ducat for Ducat with *France*, if not two to one, now that she is, or is soon like to be, eased of the Burden of supporting her own and the Imperial Troops in *Bavaria* and *Bohemia*.

If then *France* falls into a Consumption, so must *England*; and as from the Nature of her Government, the great Parsimony of her Inhabitants, and the Fertility of her Soil, it is likely she will be able to retrieve herself sooner than *England*, I can't discern the Policy of feeding a Flame that probably will burn Friend and Foe equally; or rather, the first more and sooner than the latter.

But,

But, on a Supposition that the *Dutch* have had no other View by their Augmentations, than to guard against Events; nor by their Succours, either of Troops or Money, to the Queen of *Hungary*, but to fulfil their Engagements, though I cannot arraign their Justice, I can't so readily gain upon myself to applaud their Wisdom. The different Augmentations of their Troops, and their Subsidies to the Queen of *Hungary*, have been very expensive; but had they, in the Beginning, shewed a firm Willingness to maintain Peace in the Empire, *England* must have joined them, though unwilling, in those early Days, in Tenderness to *H——r*, and *France* and *Prussia* would then be very cautious how they would interrupt the *Germanick* Tranquillity. Thus might the Republick, without Expence or Bloodshed, have preserved the Peace of the Empire, and the Power of the House of *Austria*.

It is true, the Form and Nature of the *Dutch* Government won't admit of so great Expedition in their Deliberations, on some Points, as may be expedient, and sometimes necessary: But, in the present Case, it was not necessary to consult the different Provinces and Towns; a steady Representation from the *States General* to the several Courts interested, must necessarily have produced a Congress, rather than a War, for determining the Claims of the Houses of *Bavaria* and *Brandenburg* to that of *Austria*; but the critical Hour is long since elapsed on which the *States* might have commanded Peace: And, though it may be probable that they repent them of having slipt it, I am sorry they don't seem inclined to an Amendment of their Fault, by insisting at present that the Queen of *Hungary* should listen to those reasonable
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Proposals of Peace that have been offered her by the Emperor and *France*.

But, though the *Dutch* have all along too cautiously avoided the Office of Mediators, yet I will not suppose that their Caution proceeded from any Design they had formed of breaking with *France*: For, besides that *Holland* can't well hope to reap any Benefit by a Breach with that Crown, and that on the contrary a War in *Flanders*, which would be inevitable in case of a Rupture, might be productive of Consequences injurious to the United Provinces; I say, besides these Reasons, alone sufficient to outweigh all the Solicitations of the Courts of *London* and *Vienna*, there are many others which should determine a wise State to adhere to the pacifick Maxims she has long observed.

The States are engaged by no Treaties, unless it be very lately and secretly, to gratify the Pride, Resentment, or Ambition of the Queen of *Hungary*, or any other Power, by acting offensively against *France* in order for Conquest: But, if there had been any Engagement of this Nature entered into, it would be far better evaded than fulfilled, as being contrary to Religion and Humanity, and of Course to all that might be expected from a wise and moderate Republick. Reputation to a State is like Credit to a private Adventurer or Banker. A State should be no less cautious of risking its Honour and Reputation; than the Merchant his Credit: For, how rich soever the Adventurer, he is soon unhinged if he loses his Credit; and how powerful soever the State, it loses half its Weight and Influence, if it loses its Reputation, or forfeits its Honour. On this Foundation then, I say, 'tis improbable that *Holland* should risk
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the losing so valuable a Thing as Reputation, to gratify peevish or ambitious Powers.

But, to consider the Incumbrances and present Circumstances of the *Dutch*, there is scarce a Probability that they will dance after the Fiddle of more wanton Powers. Wanton, did I say, which expresses Affluence and Repletion! Where is the Power now in *Europe*, who is, or has any Right to be wanton in this Sense, except the King of *Portugal* and State of *Venice*, who have been long idle Spectators of the Calamities of the rest of *Europe*? The Epithet *Wanton* would very improperly be applied to the Queen of *Hungary*, who is so enfeebled as to be obliged to lean heavily on the Shoulders of others. It would become *England* very little better, which, besides owing 50 Millions *Sterling* of her old Incumbrances, is taxed up to the Height, and in a galloping Consumption with regard to her Trade and Industry.

But let me recollect: If *England* have no Pretence to *Wantonness*, may not her younger Sister of *Hannover* put in her Claim? If the Coffers of *England* be drained, are not those of her Sister replenished? If the Blood be drawn from the Vitals of the one, is it not politically injected into the Vessels of the other? Tho' *England* be indebted, has not *H——r* made considerable Purchases? We are not now examining the Coin in which the Purchase-money was paid. If the Subjects of *England* be taxed beyond their Strength, are not those of the *E——te* cherished and eased? Are they not of the Number of the Elect who are to be saved, whilst their insular Brethren are doomed to be ——?

To consider then every Circumstance of *H——r*; if we can't call it the Land of Promise, because of its
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Barrenness, we may very properly that of *Wantonness*. This then, and not *England*, is that wanton Power, after whose Fiddle *Holland* may be obliged to dance : And why not as well as a *more powerful State*, that has jigged to it all round *Europe*, for near thirty Years past ?

This State, however emaciated by her many expensive Frolicks of late Years, is not so sick of her Diversions, but that she seems inclined to lead up a grand Dance, though 'tis odds but she is left by the whole Company to pay the Musick.

To quit the ludicrous for the serious Stile, What can *England* mean by her present Conduct ? Does she hope to pay off her Debts, recover her Trade and better her Condition, by an expensive War on the Continent ? Perhaps she may hope to aggrandize the House of *Austria* at the Expence of *France*, and so wrest the Balance of Power from that ambitious Crown ; or, more likely, she may intend to fix her Standards once more again on the Banks of the *Garronne*, the *Loire* and the *Senne*. There is nothing which a resenting, powerful, unincumbered Nation, with a warlike Prince at their Head, may not attempt and succeed in : But, though we shan't go about denying that People Power, nor their Monarch all moral and military Virtues ; yet, in my humble Opinion, they are not at this Time a Match for *France* ; nor do I think, if they were, that it would be their Interest to subdue that Kingdom if they could do it. Indeed, were they sure that the future Princes of the present Royal Line would have the *amor patriæ* as strong upon them as his late Majesty, and ——— they need not apprehend that the Conquest of *France* would prove injurious to *England* : But, unless they could

secure the Affections of their future Monarchs, I don't think they ought to risk the becoming *Bankers* to *France*, as they have been, for many Years, to a far more despicable Land. It is the *Interest* of this favoured Land, though an *Interest* that clashes with their own, which at present seems to incline the *English* Nation, and to direct all their Councils and Measures. — Let us examine these different Interests separately, to see if we can fathom the present mysterious Depth of *English* Politicks.

We have observed, that it would have been the *Interest* of *England* to give an early and vigorous Support to the Heiress of *Austria*, as soon as the Intentions of *Prussia* and *Bavaria* were known. It was equally the *Interest* of *Holland* to act in conformity; but the separate *Interest* of *H—r*, tied up *England*; which being so perceivable by all *Europe*, and by *Holland* in particular, she thought it more prudent to lie by, than raise herself Enemies, whom she alone was unable to withstand. But it may be naturally ask'd, how it was the *Interest* of the favour'd Land to stay the Motions of *England*, and consequently of *Holland*, in favour of the Queen of *Hungary*? You who are no Stranger to the envious Jealousy conceived in *Germany* of the House of *Austria*, will not need a minute Discussion of this Point: But besides this Reason, though weighty in this Part of *Europe*, there were others no less cogent. By permitting the Flame of War to spread, there would be Room for being courted by both Sides, and consequently a Chance of having the Power of obliging one of the Parties, so as to induce him to guaranty the dear E——e. This Part of the Scheme, you see, has succeeded: For the late Treaty between

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Prussia and *England*, which seems to have no Object but the Guaranty of *Holland*, had never taken place, if *England* had vigorously succour'd the Queen of *Hungary* in time. Instead of a Guarantee, that neighbouring Prince would become an implacable Enemy, had *England* thwarted his Designs upon *Silesia*: 'Tis true that his being an Enemy to *England*, would be of very little or no Consequence; but the Case was quite otherwise with *Holland*.

With respect to the real Interest of *England*, the Enmity or Friendship of *Prussia* is equally indifferent. *England* can have no lucrative Views in contracting Alliances with inland States; nor has she any Reason to dread their Resentment, while she pursues her true Interest; yet to consider the late defensive Alliance between their Majesties of *Britain* and *Prussia*, and the Solemnity with which that Treaty was usher'd to the World, one would be apt to think, that *England* was unable to subsist without the great Power of *Prussia*; one may look upon that Treaty as a Key to the present Politicks of the Cabinet of *London*. It is a reciprocal Guaranty of the several Possessions of the high Contractors in *Europe*. This last Word was prudently inserted, for fear his *Prussian* Majesty should be called upon to assist with his Navy against *Spain* in *America*. Ha, ha!

But what are those Possessions belonging to his *British* Majesty, as King, that require the Guaranty of a Prince, who has not one Ship in the World? But the Scene quickly shifts, if his Majesty be considered in his *Electoral* Capacity. His Dominions in *Germany* surely are in *Europe*, and consequently come within the spiritual, and even the literal Sense

of the Words of the Treaty. On the other hand, there is no doubt that *Silesia*, that is, that Part of it torn from the Queen of *Hungary*, is likewise in *Europe*; so that in virtue of a Treaty, which to vulgar Eyes seems of no manner of Advantage to *England*, she may hereafter not a little involve herself, by being obliged to send her *Guineas*, and dance her Troops much farther off than either *Dettingen* or *Hanau*.

I have often heard it said, that there is a Clause in the Act of Settlement, which restrains *England* from incurring any Expence, or otherwise involving herself on account of *H—r*. I won't answer that such a Clause subsists unrepeal'd; but if there be, I wonder what *E—s* Minister would venture to set his Hand to any Treaty, which directly engages their Country in a Guaranty that probably will be attended with great Expence and Perplexity; and which, in every Sense, must be calculate for *H—r*, and in no Sense, can be of Benefit to *England*: I had almost said, that that Treaty is not so much as relative to it.

If there be no such Clause, there is no positive Law to convict by, and consequently all is safe as to particular Persons: But where is the *Amor Patriæ* all this while? All we shall say, is, that this glorious Virtue seems, amongst certain Ministers, to be sunk into Flattery and Servility; and, that in a certain Country, they want for nothing more than *Honesty*, or some one very good Law to enforce the Observation of all the good Laws they already have.

But if it was the Interest of *H—r* not to give early Succour to the Queen of *Hungary*, how comes it, you'll say, to be the Interest of that *E—e*, to
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support her at present, at an enormous Expence? I need not tell you, that the Expence is *England's*, and not *Hanover's*, nor that the Emoluments of the latter arise from the Out-goings of the former. This is very distinguishable at all Times, but particularly at present, when so many of her Troops are in the *English* Pay, upon better Terms than usual. Therefore, we are not to wonder, that *England* is lured to play an After-game, tho' a very bad one, if her Expences center principally, where 'tis thought there is already no Want of *English* Guineas and Crown-pieces: But there may be other Motives no less important for this seeming, but expensive Concern for that injured Princess.

The *English* are said to be a murmuring, stubborn People, tenacious of Liberty, in Appearance at least; nor are they counted less headstrong than unsteady. They seemed, for some Years past, to wear the Face of Uneasiness at least, if not Discontent, on Account of the too great *Servility*, as they called it, of their late Minister. He was, it is true, servile to Excess, if *Servility* consists in absolute Obedience on one hand, and a deep Concern for the Interest of the E——e, on the other. But are his Successors less servile, tho' their Measures seem to be very different? The late Minister's Scheme was Peace, theirs is War? But are the latter less influenced by the Interest of H——r, than the first? Not at all. The late M——r preserved Peace by falling in implicitly with all the Views of *France*, which tended to weaken the House of *Austria*; and the present M——rs go into a War, seemingly at least, to raise that House; a Work which they very well know to be above their Strength. Are not these, as much as he was, Drudges to the H——n

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Interest? It was one of the *H——n* Maxims, as it is of all the States of *Germany*, to reduce the House of *Austria*. The late *M——r* wrought upon this Maxim, and succeeded. It is no less the Maxim with *H——r*, and the other States of the Empire, to keep that House low, when once it is fallen. If the present *M——rs* did not strictly adhere to this Maxim, would they have obstructed Peace between the Emperor and the Queen of *Hungary*, almost upon her own Terms, ever since the Siege of *Prague*?

The Emperor very sincerely sought Peace, and would have purchased it at the Expence of giving up his Claims, and contenting himself with his own Patrimony; *France* was as sincere, and more earnest than the Emperor for Peace. What could the Queen desire more? Tho' she had lost *Silesia*, one of the Supports (or Legs as *Germans* call them) of her House, to *Prussia*, by the Peace she secured for ever the other; *Bohemia* is this other Buttress that supports the House of *Austria*, which, together with its other Dominions in *Germany*, renders it still obnoxious to many Powers in the Empire. Therefore, if the Queen, buoyed up with the vain Hopes of Conquest, was prevailed upon to reject all reasonable Overtures of Peace, won't it be suggested that it was with a View of weakening, rather than strengthening the House of *Austria*? I have already shewn, that all the Queen's Hopes of Conquest are imaginary and vain; therefore, to sooth her to continue a ruinous War, which drains her and her Subjects, when she might have had a good Peace, can be with no View but to weaken her, pursuant to *H——n* Maxims of Policy.

If the late *M——r* did steer by the *H——n* Com-

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pass in all his Schemes of Peace, is it not obvious, that the present shape their Course also by the same Compass in all their Schemes of War? But supposing neither had any Bias towards the Interest of their own Country; at least, let us say, that the pacifick Scheme was better suited to the Interest of a trading People than the warlike.

The Discontent of the Nation at the late Ministry, laid the present under a Necessity of varying the Plan of Operation; and there was not scarce any other Alternative but War. This Plan then was pursued, because it would answer several domestick as well as foreign Purposes: Shall I need to enumerate Purposes so evident and well known?

War answered the Purposes of the E——e, by the Pay of her Troops, the Presence of the Sovereign, always attended with Benefit; and by weakening the House of *Austria*, that constant Eye-sore, as has been before observed. War answered no less domestick Purposes. Court was necessarily to be made by new Servants, that in a manner forced themselves upon a Master; and how could it be done more effectually, than by gratifying all predominant Passions? A martial Genius is as pleased with War, as the M——r with G——ld.

But this is not all neither, tho' a very essential Benefit: The People love Bustle and Noise; are pleased with Encampments and Embarkations; and, above all, hate the *French* from Nature. War then, especially against *France*, answers every Purpose of pleasing, as well as fleecing the People: And it answers likewise the Purpose of keeping them quiet and tame, if they should not be pleased. If to these, and many other Motives, it be added, that Ministers always find

find their private Account in every Increase of the national Expence, why should it be wondered that *England* makes this terrible Figure at present on the Continent, as well as Sea?

That Nation, tho' really powerful and brave, generally set out with more Bustle and Noise; or, in other Words, more terribly than any other People; and more so than a wise Nation would care to do; because, when Men set out modestly, a Miscarriage is less mortifying and more excusable. How mortifying is it to see a Nation that talk'd of nothing less three Years ago, than conquering the whole *Spanish Indies*, squander away Millions, lose thirty thousand Men, and many of their best Ships of War, and yet be no farther advanced than the first Day of the War? How mortifying would it be, if, after so exorbitant an Expence as this same Nation has been already at, and so great Bustle and Noise as they have made to conquer for the Queen of *Hungary*, they should sneakingly come off with a worse Peace for her than she might have had six or ten Months ago? If they have had no better Success against *Spain*, an impotent Power, on their own Element, the Sea, what Hopes can they have of succeeding in a distant Land-war against *France*, the powerfulest Nation in the World, and the best skill'd in that sort of War?

The odds against the *English* in a Land-war with *France*, and the Improbability of their succeeding without Allies, or with such as there is any Probability of their engaging, are such forcible Reasons as must induce a Man, of ever so little Penetration, to suppose they never intended to be in earnest, whatever they may do to appear so, in order to answer those Purposes before-mentioned: But should they happen

to be intangled in a Web of their own weaving, and catch a Tartar by carrying the Jest too far, how unlamented would they be, by those who wish'd them best before; how ridiculed by all the World?

If *France* can win so far on the King of *Prussia*, as to remain neuter in case of an offensive War against her, I should be very apt to suspect she would wish such a War begun, even tho' the *Dutch* became her Enemies: And I am not without some Dread, that the late Action at *Dettingen* was an Earnest of her Disposition towards a War. All her Expence of Blood and Treasure hitherto was for an Ally; but in such a War as I am speaking of, her own immediate Interest would be the sole Object of her View: The *Netherlands* would necessarily become the Theatre of War. There she is strongest; and there she might, and probably would, push her Point in spite of the *Dutch* Barrier. This is the Point which *France* has had in View for near an Age; 'tis a Point the *Dutch* have most Reason to be very tender in regard to it. They risk much in losing an Inch in this Spot; but *France* can bear losing a great deal without any real Danger.

Now, should the too refin'd Politicks of the new *English* Ministry carry them so far as not to be able to retire without Loss, or Risk at least, as it happened to the Generals of the combin'd Army, by marching to *Aschaffenberg*, what Excuse could they make to an injured, bubbled Nation? What Atonement can her Generals make for Mistakes which have cost very dear, were like to cost much dearer, and may still be attended with uncommon Consequences?

We will suppose the Conquest of *Lorraine* to be the Scheme concerted between the Queen of *Hungary*

and her potent Auxiliary; it is true, this would be one Way to compensate that Princess for her Cession of *Silesia*: But with what Justice could the Consent of that Princess agree to a Scheme attended with so notorious a Breach of Faith on his Side? At least it would become him to restore the *Grand Dutchy*, infinitely more valuable in point of Revenue. Should the Conquest of *Lorrain* be in View; let us no more hear the *German*, or rather the *Austrian* Faith boasted of, nor the *Gallick* impeach'd.

But leaving Justice out of the Question, as being a Virtue the least regarded by most Princes, let us examine the Policy of the new *English* Ministry in advising an Attempt, which, if it should not succeed, will be attended with Loss and Infamy; and if it should, can be attended with no Consequence equivalent to the Expence. Supposing, after the Junction of Prince *Charles* of *Lorrain* and the *Dutch* to the combin'd Army, the *French* should be obliged to give way to the first Motions of so unequal a Force; supposing the combin'd Army in Possession of *Lorrain*, must they not be ignorant of the Skill, the Power, and great Resources of the *French* Nation, who can imagine they could long maintain the Possession? *France* will never yield a single Village by Treaty, until she be drove to it by repeated ill Success, after an Experience of a long and expensive War. And who can support such a War against her? The Queen of *Hungary* is utterly unable to defray any, or but a very small Proportion, of the Expence; the Princes of *Germany* will undoubtedly bear none at all; it is not their Interest that the Queen, or her House, should acquire additional Strength. Who then but *England* must support such an Expence as

an Attempt upon *Lorraine* will necessarily occasion? As *France* will change the Scene of War to the *Netherlands*, I agree that *Holland* must be obliged to come in for a Share of the Expence; but it will be so unequal a Proportion, that one may venture to pronounce that *England* alone must necessarily be saddled with *Three Fifths*, at least, of the Expence of a War, which can't cost so little as ten Millions annually.

Well, but supposing *England* willing, I won't say able, because of the great Weight of her Taxes and Incumbrances, to maintain such a tedious War against *France* as we have mentioned, what Benefit could she propose to herself, supposing *Lorraine*, and even *Alsace*, should be torn from *France*? Would the Loss of those Provinces impair, much less destroy her Trade, which ought to be the sole Object of *England* in her Wars upon that neighbouring Commercial Rival, or indeed on any other Nation? Her swerving from this salutary Maxim ever since the Revolution in 1688, has been attended with Consequences very injurious to her genuine Interest.

If before now there had been any Want of Proof that the Interest of *E——d* was, and probably always will be sacrificed to that of *H——r*, the present Conduct of the *E——b* Ministry would put the Matter out of Dispute: For, if the Design be to pull down *France*, I beg leave to say, that *England* had a far nearer way to it than attempting Conquests on the *Rhine* and *Moselle*. The *English* being at present potent at Sea, the first Step towards reducing *France* should be to destroy her Trade, by ruining her Colonies, by the Capture of her Trading Ships, and by making continual Descents on her Sea-coasts. To be-

begin a War against *France* by Sea in such a Manner as is here described, would have some Meaning; but to bear all or most of the Expence of a War on the Continent, as Auxiliaries only, seems to have neither Meaning or Design with regard to *England*. But may it not be otherwise with regard to the Interest of *H—r*, and the particular Interest of the new Ministry? You won't doubt it, if you reflect, as has been already observed, that *H—r*, by the Hire of her Troops, and the Presence of her *E—r*, must always be a Gainer by *England's* being deeply concerned in a War on the Continent; that the new *M—y* make their Court by falling in with the Passions of ———; and that a Land-war furnishes many more Occasions for Ministerial Jobs than one by Sea, which, one may say, is out of the Element of a *S—y* of *S—te*, or First Lord of the *T—ry*.

But why should you or I employ our Care about a Nation that has long neglected her own natural Interest? Why should we trouble ourselves about Consequences that can't, morally speaking, affect us or our Country? *S—y* would be safe from the Waste of such a War as *England* seems to meditate; and, unless it should spread to *N—s* and *S—y*, might look on with Unconcern. A tender Father's Care has lately warded off the fatal Blow from a favourite Child, and would do so again if Occasion offered; but there is little Reason to fear that his Tendernefs will be pushed too far. Should the War go on, both Sides will think it equally their Interest to court and manage our Royal Master. The Interest of *H—r* will always tie down *E—d*, particularly during the Life of the present ———, as it has lately in the memorable Neutrality seemed to have been transacted

ed by Captain *M——n* before *N——s*. *Dr——n*
 is too near *H——r* for our Master's having any
 Distaste or Cause given him in Matters that don't
 affect the immediate Interest of *H——r*.

But I forget that I ought not to make that a Toil,
 which I design'd as an Amusement. Let me then
 cut off here, by assuring you, that no one in the
 World can be more sincerely

Your's, &c.



ed by Captain M—w. before M—w. D—w.
 is too near H—w. for our Master's having any
 Diffuse or Cause given him in Matters that don't
 affect the immediate Interest of H—w.

• But I forget that I ought not to make that a Tilt,
 which I design'd as an Amusement. Let me then
 cut off here, by assuring you, that no one in the
 World can be more sincerely

Yours, &c.



THE³
AMBITION

AND
AVARICE
OF

*H*anover_____;

THE
CAUSE

OF THIS
Present War.

EDINBURGH,

Printed in the Year MDCCXLIV.

THE
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EDINBURGH

Printed in the Year MDCCXIV.

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H—————, &c.



NE would have thought, after the
 DEFENCE OF THE PEOPLE,
 and the several Pieces relating to
 the *Hanover* Forces in *British* Pay,
 especially the FARTHER VINDI-
 CATION (in which Last all the
 principal *Hanover* Jobbs are clearly
 and fully exposed) had been so long
 in almost every Hand, that there

would have been no farther Need to enlarge upon those
 Subjects.

But we seem to read rather for Amusement than In-
 struction; or if we grow wiser, 'tis to no End: We
 suffer the same ruinous Measures to be pursued, the
 same dirty Hands to be employed: We not only suffer
 Things to be done, but we authorize them, when done,
 which

which nobody even attempts to justify : And we are every Day treated in the most open, barefac'd Manner, as if equally void of Courage and Understanding.

It is, therefore, still necessary to recapitulate some Passages, to add others, and to draw such Inferences from all, as shall leave us without Excuse, if we do not provide for our Security at Home, in as effectual a Manner as we have provided against all Dangers from abroad.

In the first Place, then, I lay it down, as an invincible Truth, that this War, in which we have been, for some Time, unhappily engag'd as *Auxiliaries* ; and in which we are now more unhappily become *Principals*, was begot, and conceiv'd at *H——*, and only NURS'D here.

And to silence all Gain-sayers, it need only be recollected that, when the Emperor dy'd, *France* gave no Disturbance to the Queen of *Hungary* ; but, on the contrary, Assurances of observing the Treaties then subsisting ; which Assurances then appear'd to be real, by their neither augmenting nor moving their Troops.

That, in the midst of this Calm, the King of *Prussia*, unexpectedly, claim'd Part of *Silesia*, and took immediate Possession of what he claim'd.

And that *England*, notoriously under the Influence and Direction of ***** , instead of acting as a common Friend to both, and endeavouring to accommodate Matters, openly declared in Favour of the Queen of *Hungary*, and dissuaded her from yielding a Part of that Province, which it afterwards obliged her to relinquish ENTIRELY.

All *Europe* was astonished at this Step, and both foresaw and foretold that it would necessarily force the King of *Prussia* into the Arms of *France*, and invite the *French* Ministry, however pacific, to co-operate with him against the Queen of *Hungary*, from the Facility of the Experiment, and the, almost, Certainty of Success.

But tho' *Europe*, in the general, was astonished at this Step, the *Electorate* of — was not ; on the contrary, that Power, if it can be call'd a Power, was the only one which, at that Time, augmented its Forces ; and

made

made such Preparations as argued she was in the Secret ; and that under the Umbrage of *England*, she not only believ'd herself to be safe, but resolv'd to be a Gainer by these Commotions.

And that this was the Matter of Fact, became notorious and undeniable, when the Plan for dividing the King of *Prussia's* Dominions, was, by the Inadvertancy of a certain Minister, laid before both Houses of Parliament, among a Heap of Papers call'd for, at a remarkable Period of Time, when the Ministry were in too great a Disorder either to refuse laying Papers before the Parliament, or to know what they laid.

In the mean Time, *France* accepted the King of *Prussia's* Invitation, or rather could no longer resist the Temptation, his Assistance gave then : In consequence of which, these two Powers bestirr'd themselves so vigorously, and took their Measures so happily, that the Avarice and Ambition of *Hanover*, were, instantly and easily, humbled and disappointed : *England* was, consequently, obliged to obey her *Helm*, and alter her Course : And as to the poor Queen of *Hungary*, instead of receiving the Protection she had been promis'd by her High and Mighty Ally, she was obliged to give up ALL *Silesia*, that the justly exasperated King of *Prussia* might, at least, suspend his Vengeance upon his encroaching Neighbour. *England* was, however, to procure her an *Equivalent* for what she had lost ; and *Hanover* was determin'd to have one for what it had miss'd.

Hence proceeded the famous Negotiations, about SECULARIZATIONS in the Empire ; that *Hildesheim* and *Osnabrug*, contiguous to, and long coveted by, *Hanover*, might be annex'd to that *Electorate*, which had been so unhappily disappointed of its intended Share of the King of *Prussia's* Dominions.

From these Causes, and with these Views, we drudged on as *Auxiliaries*, IN A GERMAN WAR, but BEARING THE EXPENCES of our *Principals*, till it hath, lately, pleas'd *France* to make us *Principals* too.

This War may, therefore, be literally said to be a War of *England* against *France* : But, in Truth, no one *English* Motive hath, as yet, appeared, either in the Rise or Progress of it : *England*, indeed, is the Cat's Foot ;

Foot; and who is the *Jackanapes* there is no Need to explain.

However, we are now in; and, as far as the Interests of *Great Britain* can be concern'd, it must and will be supported by every true *Briton*.

But then the following Conditions must be understood.

That it be carried on, first and principally, for the Security and Interest of our Commerce: And, secondly, for the necessary Defence of that Part of the Continent, only, in which *England* has any Concern: I mean the **BARRIER**.

That it be carried on by *British* Means; that is, by the Fleets of *Great Britain*; and the Land-Forces of *Great Britain*; or such Mercenaries, in *British* Pay, as have no separate Views, nor no Pretence to separate Favour or Command.

And that it be concluded upon *British* Conditions of Peace only.

It will not, it cannot be thought to be carried on for *British* Views, if a single Man in *British* Pay, be sent to the Defence, or the Observation of *Lower Saxony*, however, whenever, or by whoever threaten'd or attack'd.

If *Saxe Laueburg*, taken in the last Century, by the Duke of Zell, without the least Pretence of Right, while claimed by two contending Parties, one of which had a Title that Force only could set aside: If either of these Parties, I say, should endeavour to recover that Dutchy, it does not, it cannot, in any Degree, affect *Great Britain*. We have nothing to do with it.

Should *Bremen* and *Verden*, (bought by the *Electorate*, in the first Year after the Accession of G. I. tho' known to be stolen) be invaded and conquer'd, it is no Concern of ours: but on the contrary, in that Case, our own *Linnen Manufactures* might possibly meet with that Encouragement which is now deny'd them.

Should any Part of the *Electorate* be attack'd by any Power, upon any Pretence whatever, I have the Authority of the *Act of Settlement* to assert, that *England* ought not to be encumber'd with the Expence of defending it, notwithstanding the late **TRULY BRITISH** Declaration of a late common, and now noble PATRIOT, That,

Pulteney, made Esq^r
Bath

That, if the *Electorate* were attack'd upon the Account of *England*, it was the *DUTY* of *England* to defend it. The *Act of Settlement* hath no such Proviso: And should any such insidious Interpretation be admitted, it is obvious, *Hanover* would never be attack'd but upon the Account of *England*: Consequently *England* would lose the very Benefit of being an Island, and become a most wretched Part, of a most contemptible Particle of the Continent.

If, therefore, out of a tender Concern for that *Electorate*, and from a settled Resolution to prefer the Security of that *Province* to all other Considerations, the National Troops of *England*, or the *Hanoverian Mercenaries* in *English* Pay, should all, or any of them, leave the *Barrier*, and move towards *Lower Saxony*, the only Interest of *England*, upon the Continent, would be thereby entirely sacrificed; and all the World would see, that, alike in War and Peace, we were but the Tools and Implements of*****.

As it is not to be expected or imagined, that our good Friends, the *Dutch*, will venture to bring upon themselves the Indignation of *France*, out of stark Love and Kindness for us, unless we previously enter into a *positive and express Engagement*, that the Defence and Security of the *Barrier* shall be the sole Object of the War: As it must be presumed, that even the Queen of *Hungary* must be under equal Apprehensions with the *Dutch* and us; that the Vortex of *H* ————— will, as usual, draw every Motion and every Measure within its own greedy Circle: If such an *express and positive Engagement* is, under any Pretence whatever, declin'd, we may depend upon it, that the War will not be conducted upon *British* Principles; that, consequently, the *Dutch* will take as little Share in it as possible; and that we shall be in the shocking Circumstance, of risking *all Things*, to gain *Nothing*.

If the *Hanoverian Mercenaries* should be continued in our Pay another Year, notwithstanding the *notorious Unpopularity* of their being continued this, and, notwithstanding the Evidence which hath arose, either of their not daring to fight at all, or their Resolution of fighting in no other Cause than that of the *Electorate*, it will

will become self-evident, that in the carrying on of the War, *British Means* were as little regarded as *British Ends*, BRITISH MONEY excepted; without which it could not have been carried on at all.

If the 6000 Men generously furnished last Year by the *Electorate*, should be withdrawn this Year from the combin'd Army, it will plainly appear with what View they were sent the last; and if they should be replaced by 6000 from *Wolfsbuttel* in *English Pay*, it will induce a very reasonable Suspicion, that a great Part of that Pay goes to the *Electorate*.

If a Peace should be patch'd up, by which *England* should not be left in a better Condition than it was before the War began, notwithstanding the vast Expence it has been at, neither the Peace, nor the War can be call'd *British*.

But if *Hanover*, which has no Claim to any Acquisitions, by this War, should, by the Peace, make any, such as *Hildesheim* seculariz'd, or the Alternative of *Osnabruck* turned into a Perpetuity, that Peace and that War can only be deem'd *Electoral*.

These are the present great Objects of our Attention and the War ought to be supply'd and supported only upon these Principles.

Should *Hanover* even be lost in the Squabble, *England* far from thinking to retrieve it, ought to say with the *Irishman*, who had lost a bad Wife, *That it had cost a great Loss*.

Indeed, could the absolute Cession of *Hanover*, to any Power whatever upon the Continent, procure a good Peace for *England*, it would still remain more in Debt than any Peace could pay: For, putting *Hanover* at five hundred thousand Pounds a Year, and supposing the *Fee Simple* of it sold at five and twenty Years Purchase, which is, I presume, the highest Price the Land of Germany will bear, it would produce but twelve Millions five hundred thousand Pounds; And by what Means, after a thirty Years Peace, this Nation continued fifty Millions in Debt, when, at least thirty millions have been paid off, ——— HANOVER will tell us of Pleasure.